

**RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND MISSIONS
FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO**

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Introduction.

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for the post-conflict phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years.¹ In contrast, LTG John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners, and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one else wanted to deal with.² Neither the Army nor Department of Defense had an adequate plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers and civil affairs personnel,³ and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi Arabian government.

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed to the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War. Post-conflict planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons above corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable to the generally small scale of American interventions. Also, U.S. Army leaders and planners tend to focus on winning wars and not on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes afterwards. But national objectives often can only be accomplished after the fighting has ceased, and it is possible to win a war and lose the peace.

With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks. The interagency planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilities well in advance of any possible combat, was an excellent approach. Still, that operation eventually failed because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission once military forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. Recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated the potential assistance that can be provided by international and non-governmental organizations, though coordination with them can be difficult.

In Iraq it will also be important to lessen military involvement as expeditiously as possible, so interagency planners must be sure that governmental, non-governmental, and international civilian organizations are ready to perform assigned tasks when required. The primary problem at the core of American deficiencies in providing post-conflict capabilities, resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation-building. U.S. leaders must accept this mission as an essential part of our national security and better tailor and fund the military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it. This will take considerable manpower and money.

Challenges of a Military Occupation of Iraq.

The military occupation of Iraq will face a number of unique challenges rooted in the special circumstances and political culture of that country. If the war to defeat Saddam Hussein is short with limited civilian casualties, that task will be easier. Nevertheless, the issue of Western domination is of serious concern in the Arab World and a prolonged occupation of Iraq with U.S. forces may lead to especially acute problems with the Iraqi population as well as the wider Arab World. Moreover, the more detailed nuances of Iraqi political, ethnic, and culture activities are not well-understood by even the most informed U.S. scholars, journalists, and officials.

Iraq political institutions have never been well-developed, and Iraq has a strong tradition of instability and violence in resolving political disputes. The instability was brought under control and violence institutionalized only after Saddam Hussein achieved power and established a regime of unprecedented brutality. Pre-Saddam instability may emerge in the aftermath of the dictator's removal. In particular, tensions among Iraqi religious, ethnic, and tribal communities are expected to complicate both the occupation and efforts to build a viable postwar government. Power-sharing among groups is a new and untested concept in Iraq that could well be subverted by elite political instincts to struggle for power before rivals achieve opportunities to consolidate their own gains. Also, while a struggle for power between civilian and military elites is possible and could contribute to Iraqi fragmentation, the U.S. should recognize that the military is a national institution and one of the few forces for unity within the country.

Initial Iraqi gratitude for the destruction of the Saddam dictatorship is likely under most circumstances, but many Iraqis will nevertheless assume that the U.S. intervened for its own purposes and not primarily to help them. U.S. forces therefore need to complete occupation tasks as quickly as possible and must also help improve the daily life of ordinary Iraqis before popular goodwill dissipates. Even the most benevolent occupation will confront increasing Arab nationalist and religious concerns as time passes. The possibility of terrorism being directed against occupation forces probably will increase over time, and even a small number of terrorists can be expected to create serious problems for an occupation force. A popular uprising against U.S. troops is much less likely than a terrorist campaign, but is still possible if the occupation is poorly managed.

Successfully executing the postwar occupation of Iraq is consequently just as important as winning the war. Preparing for the postwar occupation of the Iraqi political system will probably be more difficult and complex than planning for combat.

A Mission Matrix for Iraq.

Based on relevant experience and an analysis of the current situation in Iraq, this study proposes a list of essential missions that must be performed to maintain a viable state and change the regime. The way such tasks fit in the overall campaign plan for possible operations in Iraq is illustrated by Figure 1.⁴ They will be performed during a period of "Transition" that must begin while "Decisive Operations" are still ongoing. Transition will take many years, and for purposes of this study has been divided into four distinct phases. The first will encompass those requirements necessary to provide "Security," including separating factions and beginning the repair of vital infrastructure. Functions in this phase

will be almost solely the responsibility of coalition military forces, and it will take a few months to move to the “Stabilize” phase. The timelines on the chart are approximate, and different mission categories are likely to progress at varying rates.




Figure 1.

The next phase for occupying forces will be to Stabilize the country. Security tasks will continue, but services will expand and begin to incorporate civilian agencies. Their involvement should become at least equal to that of coalition military forces once they start to “Build Institutions,” where the basis of the new Iraq will be firmly established. Eventually military forces will “Handover” all duties to Iraqi and international agencies, and the new regime will be ready to resume its proper place in the world community.

In the past, no part of post-conflict operations has been more problematic for American military forces than the handover to civilian agencies. Ideally, the allocation of effort and process of shifting responsibilities should proceed as depicted in Figure 2,⁵ but in reality it normally looks more like Figure 3, where the handover is given directly to the local government. To limit the potential for any regional backlash from a perceived prolonged American military occupation, it is essential that civilian and international organizations assume coalition military responsibilities as soon as possible.




Figure 2.




Figure 3.

While recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan appear to indicate that civilian agencies are now better prepared to take over transition responsibilities from military forces, this should not be assumed for Iraq. Years of sanctions and neighbors with restrictive border policies have severely reduced the number of non-governmental organizations and international agencies prepared or positioned to enter Iraq. To facilitate participation of such groups and speed the reintegration of Iraq into the international community, sanctions and associated licensing requirements need to be removed as soon as possible, probably at the beginning of “Stabilization.”⁶

Additionally, the haphazard and ad-hoc nature of civil-military organization and planning in Afghanistan has made many NGOs and IOs wary and hesitant to deal with the American military again. Some have been especially critical of what they perceive as the manipulation of humanitarian aid for political advantage, and a blurring of roles between NGOs and military civil affairs or special operations forces. The civilian agencies feel that if they become identified with military agendas their utility will be lessened and their personnel endangered.

Another factor that could further limit any civilian involvement in Iraq is the threat of biological or chemical weapons. No governmental, non-governmental, or international organization is trained or equipped to operate in such an environment, and most will not even go near an area where the use of such weapons is just rumored.

While some UN agencies and aid groups like CARE and the Jordan Red Crescent have begun to anticipate future requirements, little money will be available until a crisis erupts. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees received a 25 percent budget cut in 2002, and has had great difficulty getting preliminary support or financial commitments for Iraqi contingencies. Some donors who made pledges to Afghanistan have still not met those obligations, and the costs of reconstruction there were grossly underestimated. So, military planners would be wise not to assume too much support from civilian agencies, especially those outside the U.S. government, for the early phases of Transition.⁷ The United States should work to put together the broadest possible coalition to carry out combat operations, since that group will also inherit the immediate responsibility for Transition.

The Mission Matrix for Iraq (Appendix A) was constructed with these facts in mind.⁸ The 135 essential tasks are grouped into 21 mission categories and arrayed across the four phases of Transition described above. Each column lists those agencies that should be involved in performing that task during a specific phase. The focus is on outside U.S. and international organizations. While Iraqi participation is not specifically stated except in a couple cases of special emphasis, it should be understood that local Iraqis will be involved as much as possible in each activity. That is why quickly establishing an effective personnel vetting process is so important.

It should also be noted that each task will proceed on a different timeline, determined by individual measures of success developed by planners. For instance, reestablishing the legal system in Category 3 might advance quickly into Stabilizing and Building Institutions, while the major security activities in Category 1 lag behind. Achievements might differ between regions, as well. Commanders and governors must be aware of the progress achieved in each task in each part of the country.

While the Mission Matrix appears complicated, the array of activities involved in rejuvenating Iraq and changing its regime will actually be even more complex. And leaders of the occupation must keep in mind the dangers of being too successful in supplying services. The final goal is to create an Iraqi state that can stand on its own, not one dependent on American or international aid.

While all 135 tasks will have to be accomplished to fully reestablish an Iraqi state, they are not all of primary concern for the commander of coalition military forces. Thirty-five are considered “critical.” If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate emphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure. The thirty-two “essential” tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of coalition military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks. However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission. The remaining sixty-eight “important” tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the responsibility of non-military agencies. The rating of these tasks is valid whether there is a civilian or military governor of Iraq. They will have to be accomplished no matter who is in charge. We now summarize each Mission Category in more detail, paying particular attention to military roles. The categories themselves are not prioritized.

Major Security Activities. Most coalition combat forces will be occupied with these tasks for some time, though there will also be plenty to do for specialized units like Military Police. Considering the political aspects of an Iraqi occupation and the size of the forces required, military planners should not assume a major UN peacekeeping role. The U.S.-led coalition might be able to broaden its participation for tasks like training the new Iraqi Army, which eventually must be able to assume these security responsibilities. Part of this training program should include bringing selected Iraqi officers to the United States for special courses on how an army should function in a more democratic state. A long-term solution also requires creating a trustworthy and transparent new Iraqi government that will live up to its international obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction and other issues.

Many long-term cautions should be considered in conducting these major security activities. In separating factions, coalition military forces must avoid the dangers of unplanned and escalating alienation of ethnic and religious groups such as the Israelis experienced during their occupation of Lebanon. That example also illustrates the previously noted problems that will grow if an occupation begins to be perceived as permanent.⁹ Military commanders and forces must be clear from the beginning that they intend to leave as quickly as possible, they must demonstrate progress toward that end, and civilian organizations that accept a handover of responsibilities in turn must be clear that they aim to return control to Iraqi institutions as soon as possible.

Public Administration. First priority in this mission category will be establishing viable local governments, relying as much as possible on existing institutions. Civil affairs units will be needed throughout the country to assist this process. Evaluating the trustworthiness and reliability of indigenous administrators will be important, and the effort should begin now to gather a body of regional experts, Americans and trusted Iraqis, who can make such judgments. National government will be developed in later phases of Transition, and while civil affairs can help with this task, the responsibility primarily will be with other agencies. All troops need to be aware of the importance of preserving public records, and this must be emphasized from the beginning of actual military operations.

Legal. While coalition military forces will pick up missions in this category as security is being established, overall responsibility should be passed fairly quickly to other agencies. However, commanders should be prepared to provide support for war crimes tribunals for a while, and depending on what system is decided upon for prosecution, military personnel might be involved with the actual trials. In regard to quickly reestablishing civilian courts, judges and lawyers from the Arab League might be available, though coordination for such augmentation should begin early.

Public Finance. The coalition military commander must be prepared to take necessary actions to keep the public finance system operating until civilian government agencies can take responsibility. Again, civil affairs units will be instrumental.

Civil Information. Information will be a key tool in gaining and maintaining the support of the Iraqi people. Coalition military forces will have to work promptly while security is being established to restore and maintain mass media to communicate around the nation, and to coordinate messages with whatever transition government exists. The initial priority

for restoring capabilities must be given to government systems with wide range and newspapers with the largest circulation.

Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services. While it would be best to let the Iraqis control access to historic and cultural sites, an occupying power assumes responsibility for security of such places. Particular attention must be paid to religious and historic sites that have great importance; their damage or disruption could fan discontent or inspire violence, not just within Iraq but around the region. At the same time public access must be assured, especially to religious sites. The coalition military commander will have to delicately balance these competing requirements for security and access.

Public Safety. Coalition military forces will have to include a sufficient number of military police to perform law and order tasks until an international or trustworthy indigenous police force can be established in sufficient numbers. This may take some time. For example, it is estimated that training and deploying a new Afghan police force will take at least 3 years.¹⁰ Iraq does not contain the same density of UN and NGO demining elements as Afghanistan did, so coalition forces will also have to be prepared to do more of those missions. Requirements may be reduced if coalition military forces limit their own use of mines and cluster bombs. The latter can be especially problematic. Human Rights Watch estimates that more than 12,000 unexploded bomblets remain on the ground in Afghanistan, and well over 100 civilians have been killed or maimed by them since October 2001.¹¹

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. This is another category that will require regional experts for vetting and evaluation of personnel. A system resembling the *Fragebogen* questionnaires used in postwar Germany might be relevant for this process.¹² First priority for coalition military forces will be disarming groups and securing weapons.

Electoral Process for More Participatory Government. Many proposals are being discussed about the future form of Iraq's government. American-style democracy is probably not the ideal model for a Middle Eastern state, but some system with increased popular participation should be adopted. This will not be a decision for the coalition military commander to make, but he will be involved in supporting elections, as well as the constitutional convention and referendum to shape and legitimize the new government.

Disaster Preparedness and Response. Coalition military forces must be prepared to provide these services until civil capacity can be restored. As with most other categories, the intensity of the conflict preceding Transition will have a great impact on the timeline leading to Handover.

Public Works. Iraq's infrastructure has deteriorated under sanctions, and coalition military engineers will have to begin repairing key facilities early in the Security phase. This will be necessary to facilitate their use by the coalition as well as by the Iraqis. This mission will be much easier if the coalition limits destruction with careful targeting during combat operations.

Public Utilities. Special concerns for this mission category resemble those for the previous one. Restoring public utilities quickly will have a significant impact on public health and sanitation, and help avoid epidemics.

Telecommunications and Public Communications. Restoring communication links will help tie the country together. First priority should be given to broadcasting systems to facilitate nationwide coalition information operations. Computer networks and Internet sites also are included in the telecommunications systems to be restored and maintained.

Education. Though this is primarily a category for civilian agencies, some engineer and civil affairs effort should be dedicated to helping rejuvenate public schools. Iraqi education has seriously deteriorated under sanctions. Students in schools are off the streets and out of trouble. It also will be important to quickly implement job training programs for the many Iraqi unemployed.

Public Health. This is a category where help from international and non-governmental organizations should be forthcoming fairly quickly, though the limitations mentioned earlier about access and WMD might have significant impact. Iraqi medical personnel and facilities should also be available, though sanctions again have had a deleterious effect. Coalition military support will be especially important early in the Transition to provide and distribute health-related supplies. Many non-governmental organizations have already voiced concerns about the potential health and environmental disaster that war could bring to the whole region, and coalition military forces must contribute to preventing such an outcome.¹³

Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief. This will be another mission category of very high international visibility.¹⁴ The coalition military commander and governing authorities will need to work with UN agencies to exploit the resources and 46,000 distribution centers of the Oil for Food Program. Again there should be some responsive IO and NGO support for what could be a massive refugee problem. Caring for and controlling displaced populations will require extensive and well-orchestrated civil-military cooperation that should have already started.

Economics and Commerce. First priority in this category for coalition military forces will be to secure, repair, and maintain oil facilities. If Saddam Hussein burns wells as he did in Kuwait, military forces will have to provide assistance to fire-fighting organizations. Managing oil revenues will be very important in rebuilding Iraq and perhaps funding occupation costs, and coalition military forces will have to coordinate with many agencies on this complicated issue. Iraqi technocrats should also be available for assistance, though some vetting will be necessary to insure their reliability.

Labor. This mission category should not be a concern for the coalition military commander.

Property Control. Though this category is also not directly a coalition military force responsibility, the military will be preserving the public records as mentioned under Public Administration. These will provide important documentation to establish ownership systems.

Food, Agriculture, Fisheries. During the Security phase, coalition military forces will have some responsibility to insure the availability and flow of food and agriculture. To avoid famine the coalition commander must be sensitive to the timing of the initial planting and

harvest, and might have to provide supporting resources to overcome any post-conflict disruption.

Transportation. During the Security phase especially, coalition military forces will have primary responsibility for the operation of Iraqi transportation systems which will be essential for military as well as civilian organizations. These duties will require many specialized units which must be available from the beginning of any hostilities. These systems have deteriorated under sanctions, but the Iraqi technocrats who have maintained them should be available to help operate them.

As is apparent from the matrix and discussion of mission categories, civil affairs, engineer, military police, and transportation units will be in high demand. Some of these specialties have been stretched thin by requirements for the war on terrorism.¹⁵ At the same time a strong combat force will be essential, at least during the Security and Stabilize phases. It would be advisable for military leaders, and especially the Army, to perform a detailed analysis of the force requirements for Title X and other missions in a post-conflict Iraq. The Army Staff could conduct this exercise at the Center for Strategic Leadership of the U.S. Army War College, which has already developed a concept for a wargame that will examine such issues. It will involve all major service components, and possibly joint players, since the impact of requirements for occupying Iraq will have repercussions on force providers around the world.

While this study has focused specifically on Iraq, these insights will apply to any important post-conflict operation. The U.S. Army has been organized and trained primarily to fight and win the nation's major wars. Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in peace as well.

ENDNOTES

1. For more on Operation ECLIPSE in Germany, see Kenneth O. McCreedy, "Planning the Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. LXV, No. 3, July 2001, pp. 713-739.

2. John J. Yeosock, remarks in "What We Should Have Done Differently," Part II of *In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm*, Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000, p. 25.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 29; Janet A. McDonnell, *After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999.

4. This chart is primarily the product of COL Stephen Kidder of the U.S. Army War College.

5. This depiction was developed by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.

6. These observations and those in the next two paragraphs came from NGO and IO participants at two conferences, a Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Project on the Means of Intervention Ground Operations Workshop held at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, DC, on October 17-18, 2002; and an Institute for National Security Studies/Naval Postgraduate School Workshop on "Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam's Rule," held at National Defense University in Washington, DC, on November 20-21, 2002.

7. Moni Basu, "Aid Groups Get Ready for War," *Atlanta Journal and Constitution*, December 23, 2002; James Bone, "UN Chief Issues Secret Orders for War in Iraq," *TimesOnline*, December 23, 2002, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-522510,00.html>; Mukesh Kapila and Karin Wermester, "The Afghan Job is Bigger Than Expected," *International Herald Tribune*, January 14, 2003.

8. For the completion of the Mission Matrix, the authors are indebted to the participants in the Post Conflict Military Missions Workshop held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, on December 10-11, 2002, and particularly to Professor William Kiehl, of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute.

9. For further analysis of the Israeli experience in Lebanon, see W. Andrew Terrill, "Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War," *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 22-35.

10. Chris Kraul, "In Afghanistan, Guns Hold Sway Over Law," *Los Angeles Times*, December 27, 2002, p. 1.

11. Peter Slevin and Vernon Loeb, "Bush Urged to Limit Weapons in Iraq," *Washington Post*, December 27, 2002, p. 12.

12. For more on the use of the *Fragebogen*, see Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946*, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975.

13. See, for example June Salvage, *Collateral Damage: The Health and Environmental Costs of War on Iraq*, London: Medact, 2002. Medact is the United Kingdom affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

14. A number of organizations have already raised red flags about the impact of war in Iraq on the whole region due to refugee flows. See, for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, "A New Refugee Crisis in Iraq?" *Strategic Comments*, Vol. VIII, No. 8, November 12, 2002.

15. Military police have been in especially high demand. Harry Levins, "New Guard Call-Ups Renew Question of Troop Strength," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, December 21, 2002.

APPENDIX A
MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

APPENDIX A

MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

C = Critical Task, E = Essential Task, I = Important Task

| Task No. Task | Security Phase | Stabilize Phase | Build Institutions | Handover Phase |
|---|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Category 1 - Major Security Activities | | | | |
| 1A - C | CMF | CMF, DoS, UNMOVIC | DoS, UNMOVIC | Transparent Iraq Govt |
| 1B - C | CMF | CMF | CMF, Iraqi Army | Iraqi Army |
| 1C - E | CMF | CMF | CMF (broadened) | US Army |
| 1D - C | CMF | CMF, CIA, DoJ | CMF, CIA, DoJ | |
| 1E - C | CMF | CMF | CMF | |
| 1F - E | CMF, DoJ | CMF, IATF | CMF, IATF | Iraqi Institutions |
| 1G - C | CMF | CMF | CMF, Iraqi Army | Iraqi Army |
| 1H - C | CMF | CMF | CMF, Iraqi Army | Iraqi Army |
| 1I - C | CMF | CMF | CMF, Iraqi Army | Iraqi Army |
| 1J - C | CMF | CMF | CMF, Iraqi Army | Iraqi Army |
| 1K - C | CMF | CMF | CMF, Iraqi Army | Iraqi Army |
| 1L - E | CMF | CMF | CMF, Iraqi Army | Iraqi Army |
| Category 2 - Public Administration | | | | |
| 2A - C | CMF | CMF, AID, NED, DoS, IO | AID, NED, DoS, UNDP, IO | UNDP, Iraqi Inst. |
| 2B - I | CMF | AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF | Same as above | UNDP, Iraqi Inst. |
| 2C - I | CMF, DoS | AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF | Same as above | UNDP, Iraqi Inst. |
| 2D - I | CMF, DoS | AID, NED, DoS, IO, CMF | Same as above | UNDP, Iraqi Inst. |
| 2E - E | CMF, DoJ | CMF, DoJ | Iraqi Institutions | |

Category 3 - Legal

| | | | | | |
|--------|--|-------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| 3A - E | Operate Criminal Court System | CMF, Iraqi courts | AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi | Previous + DoS/F | AL, Iraqi |
| 3B - E | Operate Civil Court System | CMF, Iraqi courts | AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi | Previous + DoS/F | AL, Iraqi |
| 3C - E | Establish and Operate System to Enact & Publicize Laws | CMF | AID,DoJ,AOUSC,AL | Previous + DoS/F | AL, Iraqi |
| 3D - E | Operate Judicial Administrative System | CMF, Iraqi courts | AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi | Previous + DoS/F | AL, UNDP, ICM, Iraqi |
| 3E - E | Support & Conduct War Crimes Tribunals | CMF | CMF,DoJ,DoS/S/WCI | CMF&ICC or Tribunal | Iraqi Institutions |
| 3F - I | Provide Legal Education | | AID,USED,AL,NGO | AID,USED,AL,NGO | AL,Iraqi |
| 3G - I | Protect Human Rights | CMF | DoS,AID,CMF,NGO | DoS,AID,ICM,NGO | ICM,NGO |

Category 4 - Public Finance

| | | | | | |
|--------|--|-----------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|
| 4A - E | Stabilize Currency | CMF, Trsy | Trsy,AID | Trsy,AID,WB,IMF | WB,IMF,Iraqi |
| 4B - I | Maintain & Operate Govt Finance System (Revenues & Distribution) | CMF, Trsy | Trsy,AID | Trsy,AID,WB,IMF | WB,IMF,Iraqi |
| 4C - I | Establish Private Financial Institutions | | Trsy,AID | Trsy,AID,WB,IMF | WB,IMF,Iraqi |
| 4D - I | Conduct Foreign Currency Exchange | Trsy | Trsy,AID | Trsy,AID,WB,IMF | WB,IMF,Iraqi |
| 4E - E | Pay Govt Civil & Military Employees | CMF | AID,DoS,CMF | AID,DoS,CMF,WB | WB, Iraqi |
| 4F - I | Collect Customs and Duties | CMF | Trsy,AID,CMF | Trsy,AID,CMF, Iraqi | Iraqi |

Category 5 - Civil Information

| | | | | | |
|--------|---|-----|---------------------|--------------------|----------|
| 5A - E | Restore and Maintain Newspapers and Print Media | CMF | AID,DoS/IIP,CMF | AID,DoS/IIP,CMF | Iraqi |
| 5B - C | R&M Government Radio System | CMF | AID,BBG,CMF,DoS,FCC | Same as previous | Iraqi |
| 5C - C | R&M Government Television System | CMF | Same as above | Same as above | Iraqi |
| 5D - I | Establish Private TV System | | AID,FCC | AID,FCC | Iraqi |
| 5E - I | Establish Private Radio System | | AID,FCC | AID,FCC | Iraqi |
| 5F - I | Develop Censorship and Libel Laws | | AID,DoJ,CMF,DoS,AL | AID,DoJ,CMF,DoS,AL | AL,Iraqi |
| 5G - I | Restore & Maintain Cable Systems | | AID,CMF,DoS | AID,CMF,DoS | Iraqi |

Category 5 - Civil Information (continued)

| | | | | | |
|--------|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|
| 5H - C | Coordinate USG-Iraq Govt Info | CMF,DoS/R | DoS/R,CMF | DoS/R,CMF | DoS/R |
|--------|-------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------|

Category 6 - Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services

| | | | | | |
|--------|--|-----------|-----------------------|-------------------|--------------|
| 6A - I | Maintain Art & Cultural Institutions | Iraqi | DoS/ECA,AID,Iraqi | Previous +UNESCO | UNESCO,Iraqi |
| 6B - I | Protect Historical Artifacts | CMF,Iraqi | DoS/ECA,DoJ,AID,Iraqi | Previous + UNESCO | UNESCO,Iraqi |
| 6C - I | Maintain Sports and Recreational Systems | Iraqi | AID,DoS/ECA,Iraqi | Previous + UNESCO | UNESCO,Iraqi |
| 6D - C | Protect Religious Sites & Access | CMF,Iraqi | CMF,Iraqi | Iraqi Forces | |

Category 7 - Public Safety

| | | | | | |
|--------|--|-----|--------------------|---------------------|----------|
| 7A - C | Establish & Maintain Police Systems and Operations | CMF | DoJ,DoS/INL,CMF,AP | DoJ,DoS/INL,AP, UNP | AP,Iraqi |
| 7B - I | Train Police | | DoJ,DoS/INL,AP | DoJ,DoS/INL,AP, UNP | AP,Iraqi |
| 7C - E | Maintain Penal Systems | CMF | AID,DoJ,CMF,AL | AID,DoJ,AL | AL,Iraqi |

| | | | | | |
|--------|---|-----|--------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|
| 7D - I | Provide & Support Fire Fighting Systems | CMF | AID,FEMA,CMF | AID,FEMA | Iraqi |
| 7E - E | Conduct Explosive Ord Disposal & Demining | CMF | CMF,AID,DoS/PM,NGO | AID,DoS/PM, UNMAS,NGO | UNMAS,Iraqi,NGO |
| 7F - I | Protect Foreign Residents | CMF | CMF,DoS | CMF,DoS,Iraqi Forces | Iraqi |

Category 8 - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

| | | | | | |
|--------|--|---------|---------|---------|--|
| 8A - E | Demobilize & Reorganize Army/Scty Forces/militias | CMF,DoS | CMF,DoS | CMF,DoS | |
| 8B - I | Transfer & Reorient to reintegrate into civil sector | | AID,CMF | AID,CMF | |
| 8C - I | Reintegrate Demobilized Persons into Civil Sector | | AID,DoS | AID,DoS | |

Category 8 - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (continued)

| | | | | | |
|--------|--|-----|--------------------------|------------------|----|
| 8D - I | Restructure & Reorganize New Civil Security Forces | CMF | DoJ,DoS/INL,CMF,AP | Same as previous | AP |
| 8E - E | Dismantle Baath Party | | NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL, CIA | Same as previous | |
| 8F - C | Disarm and Secure Weapons | CMF | CMF | | |

Category 9 - Electoral Process for More Participatory Government

| | | | | | |
|--------|---|-----|---------------------|---------------|-----|
| 9A - I | Plan Local Elections | CMF | NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL | Previous+NGO | NGO |
| 9B - I | Plan National Elections | | Same as above | Previous +NGO | NGO |
| 9C - I | Prepare Local Elections | CMF | Same as above | Previous +NGO | NGO |
| 9D - I | Prepare National Elections | | Same as above | Previous +NGO | NGO |
| 9E - I | Assist Conduct of Local Elections | CMF | Same as above+CMF | Previous +NGO | NGO |
| 9F - I | Assist Conduct of Natl Elections | | Same as above | Previous +NGO | NGO |
| 9G - I | Provide Post Local Election Support | | NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL | Previous +NGO | NGO |
| 9H - I | Provide Post Natl Election Support | | Same as above | Previous +NGO | NGO |
| 9I - I | Plan for Constitutional Convention | | Same as above | Previous | |
| 9J - I | Assist Conduct of Const Convention | | Same as above +CMF | Previous | |
| 9K - I | Assist Conduct of Constitutional Referendum | | | Same as above | |

Category 10 - Disaster Preparedness and Response

| | | | | | |
|---------|--|-----|-------------------|------------------|-------|
| 10A - I | Provide Emergency Warning Systems | CMF | AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA | Same as previous | Iraqi |
| 10B - I | Provide Emergency Evacuation and Treatment | CMF | AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA | Same as previous | Iraqi |
| 10C - I | Provide Post Disaster Recovery | CMF | AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA | Same as previous | Iraqi |
| 10D - I | Conduct Pre-Disaster Planning | CMF | AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA | Same as previous | Iraqi |

Category 11 - Public Works

| | | | | | |
|---------|--------------------------|-----|---------------|---------------|------------|
| 11A - C | Repair Roads and Streets | CMF | AID,CMF,DoS/F | Previous,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
|---------|--------------------------|-----|---------------|---------------|------------|

| | | | | | |
|---|--|-----|-------------------|--------------------|----------------|
| 11B - C | Repair Bridges | CMF | AID,CMF,DoS/F | Previous,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| 11C - C | Repair Port Facilities | CMF | AID,CMF,DoS/F | Previous,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| 11D - C | Repair Airports | CMF | AID,FAA,CMF,DoS/F | Previous,IATA,UNDP | IATA,UNDP,Iraq |
| 11E - C | Repair Railroads | CMF | AID,CMF,DoS/F | Previous,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| 11F - I | Repair Dams | CMF | AID,CMF,DoS/F | Previous,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| 11G - I | Repair Canal System | CMF | AID,CMF,DoS/F | Previous,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| Category 12 - Public Utilities | | | | | |
| 12A - C | Restore & Maintain Power Systems | CMF | AID,DOE | AID,DOE,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| 12B - C | Restore & Maintain Water Systems | CMF | AID,HHS | AID,HHS,UNDP,WHO | UNDP,WHO,Iraqi |
| 12C - I | Restore & Maintain Gas Systems | CMF | AID,DOE | AID,DOE,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| 12D - C | R&M Sewage Systems | CMF | AID,HHS | AID,HHS,UNDP,WHO | UNDP,WHO,Iraqi |
| 12E - E | R&M Garbage Collection | CMF | AID | AID,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| Category 13 - Telecommunications and Public Communications | | | | | |
| 13A - E | Restore & Maintain Telecommunications System | CMF | AID,FCC | AID,FCC,IPU | IPU,Iraqi |
| 13B - C | R&M Broadcasting Systems | CMF | AID,FCC | AID,FCC,IPU | IPU,Iraqi |
| 13C - I | R&M Postal System | CMF | AID,USPS | AID,USPS,IPU | IPU,Iraqi |
| Category 14 - Education | | | | | |
| 14A - E | Operate Public School System | CMF | AID,USED | AID,USED,UN,WB | UN,WB,Iraqi |
| 14B - I | Operate Private School System | | AID,USED | AID,USED,UN,WB | UN,WB,Iraqi |
| 14C - I | Provide Adult Education Services | | AID,USED | AID,USED,UN | UN,Iraqi |
| 14D - I | Provide Job Training Programs | AID | AID,UNDP,NGO | AID,UNDP,NGO | UNDP,NGO |
| 14E - I | Provide University Education | | DoS/ECA,USED,AID | Previous+ UNESCO | UNESCO,Iraqi |

Category 15 - Public Health

| | | | | | |
|---------|--|--------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| 15A - E | Provide Emergency Medical Service | CMF,IT | AID/OFDA,FEMA,IT | Prev.+UN,ICRC, NGO | UN,ICRC,NGO,Iraqi |
| 15B - E | Operate Hospitals | CMF,IT | AID,HHS,WHO,NGO,IT | Same as previous | WHO,NGO,Iraqi |
| 15C - E | Provide Doctors and Health Professionals | CMF,IT | AID,HHS,WHO,NGO,IT | Same as previous | WHO,NGO,Iraqi |
| 15D - E | Provide and Distribute Pharmaceutical Supplies | CMF | AID,HHS,WHO,NGO,CMF | Same as previous | WHO,NGO,Iraqi |
| 15E - E | Provide and Distribute Non-Pharmaceutical Medical Supplies | CMF | Same as above | Same as previous | WHO,NGO,Iraqi |
| 15F - E | Dispose of Medical Waste | CMF | AID,HHS,WHO | ID,HHS,WHO | WHO,Iraqi |
| 15G - E | Provide Vector Control Systems | CMF | AID,HHS/CDC,WHO | AID,HHS/CDC,WHO | WHO,Iraqi |
| 15H - E | Provide Garbage Disposal System | CMF | AID | AID,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |
| 15I - E | Insure Proper Sanitation | CMF | AID,HHS,WHO | AID,HHS,WHO,UNDP | WHO,UNDP,Iraqi |
| 15J - I | Perform Preventive Medicine | CMF | AID,HHS,WHO,NGO | Previous+UNDP | WHO,UNDP,Iraqi |
| 15K - I | Provide Mortuary Services | CMF | AID,HHS | AID,HHS,UNDP | UNDP,Iraqi |

Category 16 - Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief

| | | | | | |
|---------|----------------------------------|-----|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 16A - I | Provide Assistance to Poor | CMF | AID,USDA,WFP,NGO | Previous+UNDP | UNDP,WFP,NGO, Iraqi |
| 16B - I | Provide Emergency Relief | CMF | AID/OFDA,DoD | AID/OFDA,DoD,ICRC | ICRC,Iraqi |
| 16C - I | Operate Orphanages | CMF | AID,HHS | Prev.+UNICEF, NGO | UNICEF,NGO,Iraqi |
| 16D - I | Provide Care for Aged | CMF | AID,HHS | AID,HHS,WHO,NGO | WHO,NGO,Iraqi |
| 16E - I | Provide Psychological Assistance | CMF | AID,HHS | AID,HHS,WHO,NGO | WHO,NGO,Iraqi |
| 16F - C | Care for and Relocate Refugees | CMF | DoS/PRM,CMF,AID,UN NGO | Previous, incl. OCHA | OCHA,NGO,Iraqi |

Category 16 - Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief (continued)

| | | | | | |
|---------|---------------------------------------|-------------|------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| 16G - C | Care for & Relocate Displaced Persons | CMF,DoS/PRM | AID,CMF,DoS/PRM,UN,NGO | Previous, incl. OCHA | OCHA,NGO,Iraqi |
| 16H - C | Administer Oil for Food Program | CMF,UN | UN | UN | |
| 16I - C | Manage & Distribute Relief Supplies | CMF | AID,CMF,UN,NGO | AID,CMF,UN,NGO | UN,NGO,Iraqi |

Category 17 - Economics and Commerce

| | | | | | |
|---------|-----------------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| 17A - I | Revitalize Commercial Sector | | AID,DoC,Trsy,IT | AID,DoC,Trsy,WB,IT | WB,Iraqi |
| 17B - I | Revitalize Industrial Sector | | AID,DoC,Trsy,IT | AID,DoC,Trsy,WB,IT | WB,Iraqi |
| 17C - E | Repair & Maintain Oil Facilities | CMF, IT | AID, DoE, IT | AID, UNDP, IT | UNDP, Iraqi |
| 17D - E | Manage Oil Revenues | CMF,UN | AID,DoS,Trsy,DoE,UN | Previous +WB, Iraqi | UN,WB,Iraqi |
| 17E - I | Implement Wage and Price Controls | | AID,Trsy | AID,Trsy,WB | WB,Iraqi |
| 17F - I | Maintain Foreign Trade System | | AID,DoS,Trsy | Previous+WB,IMF | WB, IMF, Iraqi |
| 17G - I | Set Customs and Duties | | DoS,Trsy,DoC | Iraqi | |
| 17H - C | Implement Oil Fire Contingencies | AID,CMF | AID | | |

Category 18 - Labor

| | | | | | |
|---------|---|--|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|
| 18A - I | Establish and Provide Employment Services & Benefits | | AID,DoL | AID,DoL,ILO | ILO,Iraqi |
| 18B - I | Establish and Maintain System to Resolve Managment-Labor Disputes | | AID,DoL,DoS/DRL | AID,DoL,DoS/DRL,ILO | ILO,Iraqi |
| 18C - I | Establish and Monitor Worker Safety Programs | | AID,DoL,OSHA | AID,DoL,OSHA,ILO | ILO,Iraqi |

Category 19 - Property Control

| | | | | | |
|---------|--|--|-------------|-------------|-------|
| 19A - I | Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Real Property | | AID,DoC,DoJ | AID,DoC,DoJ | Iraqi |
|---------|--|--|-------------|-------------|-------|

Category 19 - Property Control (continued)

| | | | | |
|---|--|---------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| 19B - I | Establish and Enforce Ownership System for Personal Property | AID, DoC, DoJ | AID, DoC, DoJ | Iraqi |
| Category 20 - Food, Agriculture, Fisheries | | | | |
| 20A - I | Maintain Production System | CMF, IT | AID, USDA, IT | UNFAO, Iraqi |
| 20B - I | Maintain Processing System | CMF, IT | AID, USDA, IT | UNFAO, Iraqi |
| 20C - I | Maintain Distribution System | CMF, IT | AID, USDA, IT | UNFAO, Iraqi |
| 20D - I | Maintain Retail Sales System | CMF | AID, USDA, DoC | Iraqi |
| 20E - I | Establish and Execute Inspection System | CMF | AID, USDA/APHIS | Iraqi |
| 20F - I | Maintain Irrigation System | CMF, IT | AID, USDA, IT | UNFAO, Iraqi |
| 20G - E | Support Harvest | CMF | AID, CMF, USDA | |
| Category 21 - Transportation | | | | |
| 21A - C | Operate Ports | CMF, IT | AID, CMF, DoT, IT, Dos/F | UNDP, Iraqi |
| 21B - C | Operate Rail System | CMF, IT | AID, CMF, DoT, IT, DoS/F | UNDP, Iraqi |
| 21C - C | Maintain Intercity Road Network | CMF | AID, CMF, DoT, DoS/F | UNDP, Iraqi |
| 21D - E | Maintain Municipal Roads | CMF | AID, CMF | UNDP, Iraqi |
| 21E - C | Operate Air System (incl. Airspace Management) | CMF | AID, FAA, CMF, DoS/F | UNDP, IATA, Iraqi |
| 21F - C | Operate Pipelines | CMF, IT | AID, DoE, IT, DoS/F | UNDP, Iraqi |

Task Breakdown:

- 35 Critical Tasks
- 32 Essential Tasks
- 68 Important Tasks

DEFINITION OF TASK CATEGORIES:

Critical – If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate emphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure.

Essential – These tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of coalition military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks. However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission.

Important – These tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the responsibility of non-military agencies.

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------|--|
| AID – | U.S. Agency for International Development AID/OFDA- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance AID/OTI- Office of Transition Initiatives |
| AL – | Arab League |
| AP – | Arab Police Academy |
| AOUSC – | Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts |
| BBG – | Broadcasting Board of Governors |
| CIA – | Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. intelligence organizations |
| CMF – | Coalition Military Forces |
| DoC – | U.S. Department of Commerce |
| DoD – | U.S. Department of Defense |
| DoJ – | U.S. Department of Justice |
| DoL – | U.S. Department of Labor OSHA - Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Dept. of Labor |
| DoS – | U.S. Department of State DoS/PRM - Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Affairs DoS/ECA - Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs DoS/IIP - Office of International Information Programs DoS/INL - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs DoS/DHL - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor DoS/F – Future of Iraq Project DoS/G - Office of the U/S for Global Affairs DoS/R- Office of the U/S for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs DoS/CA- Bureau of Consular Affairs DoS/DRL- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor DoS/PM – Bureau of Political-Military Affairs DoS/S/WCI – Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues |
| DoE – | U.S. Department of Energy |
| FEMA – | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| HHS – | U.S. Department of Health and Human Services HHS/CDC – Centers for Disease Control |

ILO – International Labor Organization
 IATA – International Air Transport Association
 IATF – Interagency Task Force
 IPU – International Postal Union
 ICC – International Criminal Court
 ICM – United Nations International Civilian Monitors
 ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross
 IMF – International Monetary Fund
 IO – International Organizations
 IT – Iraqi Technocrats (Indigenous and Expatriate)

NED – National Endowment for Democracy
 NGO – Non-governmental Organizations

OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Trsy – U.S. Department of the Treasury

USDA – U.S. Department of Agriculture
 USDA/APHIS – Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

UN – United Nations Organizations
 UNDP – United Nations Development Program
 UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
 UNFAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
 UNMAS – United Nations Mine Action Service
 UNMOVIC – United Nations Moratorium Verification and Inspection Commission
 UNP – United Nations Police
 USED – U.S. Department of Education
 USG – U.S. Government
 UNESCO – U.N. Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

WFP – World Food Program
 WHO – World Health Organization
 WB- World Bank